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ABSTRACT
This paper uses a game-theoretic bidding model to examine the effect
of joint bidding in offshore petroleum lease auctions. While previous
research on the costs and benefits of joint bidding has been inconclusive,
we show that joint bidding increases both the efficiency and the equity
of petroleum tract auctions. These results follow from the fact that
pooling of information concerning a priori unknown tract values allows
for more accurate estimates. The anti-competitive effect of a reduced
number of bidders is more than offset by the well-known fact that better
informed participants bid more aggressively. Our findings are even more
striking in that the model abstracts entirely from the effects of in-
creased entry and greater risk diversification, the two common arguments
in support of joint bidding.

1. Introduction
Since the oil price revolution of 1973-74, auction procedures and
bidding practices in the market for offshore petroleum tracts have become
the subject of widespread interest and debate. The market for offshore
tracts effects a transfer of public mineral resources to the private
sector. Design of the transfer mechanism poses a public policy problem
that is twofold. First, it is important to design a transfer scheme
that achieves allocative efficiency, as measured by the extent to which
"profitable" tracts are identified and exploited by industry. Second,
it is important that the scheme be regarded as equitable, in the sense
that the government receive fair market value in exchange for all re-
sources given over to industry. There is no guarantee, of course, that
these dual objectives will always be compatible. For example, it is
easy to imagine provisions for extracting fair market value that would
distort subsequent development and production decisions, and thereby
diminish the value of the underlying resources. In this light, economists
have extended the literature on competitive auctions to evaluate the
performance of alternative bidding formats (see, for example, Reece [1978]
and Ramsey [1980]).
The present paper examines the effect of joint bidding on the two
policy objectives mentioned above. Joint bidding occurs whenever two
or more independent firms form a joint venture and submit a single bid.
For many years this practice has been a common, but controversial, fea-
ture of the market for offshore tracts. The major policy concern is that
joint bidding might be used to reduce or eliminate competition from the
marketplace, which would have a negative impact on market prices and
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government revenue. This concern is mitigated by the realization that
joint bidding also serves as a vehicle for entry of small firms that
would otherwise be excluded from the market. Moreover, joint bidding
facilitates the diversification of risk, which reduces the cost of capi-
tal and enhances the value of offshore tracts, whether these positive
factors outweigh the negative aspects of joint bidding has been a ques-
tion of continuing debate among economists and policymakers alike.
Although several studies have discussed the pros and cons of joint
bidding in qualitative terms (Mead [1967], Gaskins and Vann [1976],
Wilcox [1974]), no study has succeeded in measuring and weighing the
relative costs and benefits, or to quantify the net effect of joint bidding
on the outcome of the auction. As a result, the debate regarded joint
bidding remains inconclusive and policymakers have adopted an ambivalent
position. Prior to 1976 no restrictions were placed on the formation of
joint bidding ventures; since that time, however, joint bidding has been
prohibited among a select group of large firms but permitted elsewhere.
In this paper we present new evidence regarding the net effect of
joint bidding on market performance. By adapting a game-theoretic bid-
ding model that is common to this literature, we are able to characterize
equilibrium bidding strategies and expected market outcomes as a function
of the extent of joint bidding. The results are striking. Very briefly,
our results indicate that joint bidding enhances both the efficiency and
equity of the market for offshore petroleum tracts. That is, joint bid-
ding increases the economic value of offshore petroleum resources and
the fraction of this value captured by government via the competitive
bidding process.
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The intuition behind these results centers on the information struc-
ture of the auction. Prior to bidding, each firm performs a "test" (e.g.,
geophysical research) that increases its knowledge of the tract's uncer-
tain value. Formation of a joint bidding venture is tantamount to pooling
the results of several independent tests, which further increases the
2
stock of information on which the subsequent bid will be based.'" There
are two principal consequences both of which have a positive impact vis
a vis the two policy objectives discussed earlier. First, bidders are
able to more accurately identify worthwhile prospects; i.e., tracts for
which the market value of reserves exceeds the cost of recovery (Reece
[1978]). The implication is that the auction market is more efficient
3
under a regime of joint bidding. Second, as bidders become more knowl-
edgeable regarding tract value they tend to bid more aggressively, thereby
increasing the expected \ralue of the winning bid in both absolute and
relative terms (Matthews [1982]).
We illustrate these effects by presenting numerical results appli-
cable to the market for offshore petroleum tracts. The results indicate
that both government revenue and the value of offshore tracts to society
at large increase under a regime of joint bidding. In addition, the
percentage of subraarginal tracts that draw bids decreases significantly
under a regime of joint bidding.
These favorable results are especially compelling because they
devolve from a model that abstracts entirely from the two most common
arguments in favor of joint bidding. Specifically, our model assumes
all bidders to be risk-neutral. Therefore joint bidding's potential for
enhanced diversification of risk is not represented in the results sum-
marized here. In addition, our model does not allow joint bidding to be
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used as a vehicle for market entry; thus the total number of participants
in the auction is fixed. Consequently, the number of independent bidding
entities decreases unambiguously under our regime of joint bidding due
to the consolidation of potential rivals. Relaxing either of these model
restrictions would produce even stronger evidence in favor of joint bid-
ding.
2. The Model
The government leases offshore tracts in a first-price sealed bid
auction. The tract is either awarded to the highest bidder at the stated
price, or it remains unsold in the event that no bids are submitted.
Following Wilson [1977] and Reece [1978], we model the auction as a non-
cooperative game with incomplete information.
The major assumptions of the model are as follows. There are n identi-
cal bidders competing for a single offshore oil tract. The in situ value
of the petroleum reserve is a random variable (v) that follows a known
lognormal probability density function represented by h(v|u ,a ), where
u and a are the mean and standard deviation, respectively. The assump-
v v
tion of lognormality has been used by a number of previous authors in
this area (e.g., Reece [1978]). In situ value is measured net of all
recovery costs except the cost of exploratory drilling, which is assumed
to be a known constant (fc) . Thus, the net value of the tract (V) is
given by the relation: V = v - fc.
Prior to the auction, each participant obtains an estimate(s) of in
situ value. The estimates are drawn from independent, identically
distributed, and unbiased lognormal sampling distributions represented
by the density function g(s|u (v),a (v)), with cumulative distribution
° ' s s
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denoted as G(s|v). Finally, each bidder is assumed to be risk neutral
and to know the number (n) of participants in the auction.
Each participant is free to associate with others via the formation
of joint bidding ventures. To illustrate the effect of varied degrees of
cooperative action, the number of members in each joint venture is para-
meterized by the value m. Thus, the degree of joint bidding is assumed
to be uniform throughout the industry, and the number of independent
bidding entities that result is simply N, where N = n/m. Values for
parameter m may vary from 1 (the case of no joint bidding) to n (in
which case all bidders belong to a single joint venture). The prevailing
value of m is assumed to be known by all participants.
One effect of joint bidding is to reduce the number of potential
competitors; this is, of course, the anti-competitive aspect. However,
the act of joint bidding has the additional effect of changing the in-
formation structure of the auction. By pooling the information of its
members, each joint venture acquires a vector of m independent and identi-
cally distributed value estimates (_s = {s ,...,s }) characterized by the
following joint density function:
m
g^ = (sjv) = n g(s i |y s (v),ag (v)).
i=l
Conditional on the hypothesized degree of joint bidding, the problem
in
faced by each joint venture is to identify a bidding strategy, b (s) : R * R,
that maximizes expected profits
:
(1)
CO CO
i... [v-fc-b
N
(s.)]-F
N
(b,v).g
m
(s|v)ds_ dv;
v=0 s n -=0 s =01 m
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where : b„(s) represents the bid entered when the consortia
N —
observes value estimates s_, and
F (b,v) represents the probability of winning the
lease when true value is v and bid b is submitted.
Solution for optimal bidding strategies based on Equation 1 is un-
duly complicated. The problem may be simplified by noting that the
geometric mean of value estimates obtained by a joint venture (i.e.,
m
i
,
s = II s. ) is a sufficient statistic for v. Thus, an equivalent
i=l X
problem for the joint venture is to identify a bidding strategy,
b (s):R -*• R, that determines the bid solely as a function of the
geometric mean of the sample. Therefore, we can rewrite the problem
without loss of generality as:
(2) max: [v-fc-bN (s)]-FN (b,v)-g(s|v) ds h(v)dv;
b rT (s) v=0 s=0
_
a
s
^
where: g(s|v) = g(s|u (v), ), and
G(s v) g(s|v)ds
The favorable effect of joint bidding should by now be apparent.
The standard deviation of the joint venture's estimating process varies
inversely with the number of members. Consequently, larger joint ven-
tures are better able to estimate v, and to determine whether the tract
is economic (i.e., v-fc > 0). The anti-competitive effects of joint
bidding are equally clear. The act of bidding jointly reduces the number
of independent competitors by n(—
-) relative to the case of solo bidding.
To illustrate the net impact of these countervailing forces, it is necessary
to investigate the outcome that results from such an auction, and the manner
in which the outcome is affected by the hypothesized degree of joint bidding.
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In order to examine expected auction outcomes, we adopt the equi-
librium concept due to Nash. A Nash equilibrium strategy, b*(s) , is
determined such that no individual bidder has an incentive to depart
from b*(s)
,
given that all his rivals are using this strategy. In
is
equilibrium, all bidders use identical strategies. Consequently, the
function F (b,v) is, in equilibrium, simply the probability that no
competitor obtains a higher mean value estimate of in situ value:
(3) F (b*(s),v) = Gdlv) 1*" 1 if b >
iN IN
= otherwise.
As shown by Wilson [1977], the equilibrium bidding strategy for
each firm is determined from the first-order condition obtained by dif-
ferentiating Equation 2 and making the substitution indicated by Equation
3. The resulting condition appears as follows
(4) i-JL-
ds
[v-fc-b*(s)](N-l) G(s|v) N" 2g(s|v)Uv!s)dv
G(s|v) N l Jo(v|s)dv
In Equation 4, £(v|s) represents the conditional distribution of in situ
value given the signal s, as derived by Bayes theorem from g(s|v) and
h(v).
Once the appropriate initial condition has been specified, Equation
4 can be integrated to determine a unique equilibrium bidding strategy
function. Reece [1978] suggests that an appropriate initial condition
is that each bidder shall tender a positive (i.e., non-zero) bid only if
the expected profit from doing so is non-negative. This requires:
(5) b*(s Q )
= 0;
CO
where s satisfies: (v-fc)'G(s |v) •£(v|s n )dv = 0.U U
o
In principle, Equations 4 and 5 characterize completely the equilibrium
bidding strategy for each firm. In practice, however, the equations do
not permit a general analytic solution. Therefore the results that
follow are based on particular numerical solutions obtained for specified
values of the input parameters.
Before presenting any numerical results, it is necessary to define
reasonable criteria for judging the outcome of the auction. Here we
follow Reece [1978] quite closely. Maximum potential expected value
(MPEV) of the tract to society is simply the expected net value of the
tract computed under the assumption that fixed exploration costs are
incurred if and only if the tract is economic:
(6) MPEV =
fc
(v-fc)h(v)dv.
The expected fraction of MPEV captured by the industry (f ) can be
written as a function of the degree of joint bidding:
OO OO
[v-fc-b
N
(7)]F
N
(b,v)-g(¥|v)-h(v)d7 dv
,,v e , x(/) f T (m) =I v ' MPEV
The expected fraction of MPEV captured by the government (f ) is
00 CO
given by
:
N
(8) f„(» = ° °
bJj(s)FN(b,v)g(s,v)h(v)ds dv
G v ' MPEV
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Finally, the expected fraction of MPEV captured by society as a
whole (f ) is simply:
(9) f
s
(m) = f
I
(m) + f
G
(m).
The reader should note that since there always exists some uncer-
tainty regarding tract value, f can never reach 100 percent. However,
as we demonstrate below the effect of joint bidding is to reduce
uncertainty, thus causing f to increase. There are two mechanisms
through which this occurs. First, the conditional probability that a
tract will be leased, given that it is economic, varies directly with
the degree of certainty regarding its value. Second, the conditional
probability that a tract is economic, given that it is leased, also
varies directly with the degree of certainty regarding its value. These
results are due to Reece [1978], who showed the following:
(l-G(¥ |v) N)-h(v)dv
(10) Prob (leased economic) =
(11) Prob (economic] leased) =
fc
1 - H(fc)
(l-G(s !v) N)-h(v)dv
fc
(l-G(s |v) N)-h(v)dv
In the next section, we demonstrate the effects of joint bidding with
illustrative calculations based on Equations 6 - 11. The hypothesized
degree of joint bidding (m) will be varied parametrically in order to
isolate its influence on the results.
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3. Numerical Results
To realistically assess the quantitative impact of joint bidding on
the outcome of the auction, it is necessary to choose realistic numerical
values for all model parameters. Reece [1978] has developed a set of
parameter values that approximate the environment of offshore petroleum
leasing. Our results are based on Reece 's parameter values because we
feel they are a good approximation of real-world conditions, and because
this allows comparisons of our results to Reece' s findings. The specific
parameter values employed are described below.
The lognormal distribution of tract value (v) is characterized by
2
the expectation (y ) and variance (o ) of log v. These parameters are
given respective values of 1.0 and 2.0 in the present study. Fixed develop-
2
ment costs (fc) are determined, conditional on u and a , such that thex ' * v v
probability that the tract is economic is 15 percent; i.e., fc satisfies
the equation:
h(v u ,o ) = 0.15.
1 V V
fc
The conditional estimating distribution g(s|v) is characterized
2 2
by the expectation (y ) and variance (o ) of log s. Parameter a
s s ^
is alternately assigned the values 0.3, 0.6, 1.2, and 1.6, with the
higher value being mors appropriate to unexplored or "wildcat" regions.
Given a value for a~ , the value of u is then determined exactly by the
s s
requirement that the conditional estimating distribution be unbiased (i.e.,
o
y = In v - a"/2).
s s
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The number of independent firms (n) is initially set at 20. The
number of firms permitted to enter into a single joint venture (m) is
varied to guarantee integer values of N, the number of distinct bidding
entities. Thus, m varies over 1, 2, 4, 5 and 10 implying values of
N = 20, 10, 5, 4 and 2 respectively.
Table 1 shows how the expected division of economic rent between
industry and government is affected by the degree of joint bidding.
2
Four separate environments are considered (a = 0.3, 0.6, 1.2, and 1.6);
these scenarios correspond to situations of decreasing precision in the
value-estimating procedure available to individual participants. The
degree of joint bidding is measured along the horizontal scale. The
first column (with m = 1) corresponds to the well explored case where
joint bidding is prohibited. All table entries have been derived by
solving Equations 4 and 6-9 with the assistance of numerical integra-
tion routines supplied by IMSL (International Mathematical and Statistical
Libraries, Inc.).
Perhaps the most significant result in Table 1 is that, under all
four cases, the expected value of the tract to society at large (f )
increases directly with the degree of joint bidding. Because there are
greater benefits to pooling information when the estimating procedure
2
is less precise (i.e., high a ), the benefits of joint bidding become
more pronounced in moving from case 1 to case 4. At one extreme
2(c = 1.6), joint bidding increases the total social value of the tract
by 12.6% (cf. column 1 with column 4). At the other extreme (o = 0.3),
s
joint bidding increases the total social value of the tract hardly at all.
Even when joint bidding exerts little influence on the total social
value of the tract (e.g., case 1), it does significantly affect the
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TABLE 1
Distribution of Rent with Joint Bidding
n = 20 for all cases
N = 20 10 5 4 2
2
a = 0.3
m = 1 2 4 5 10
Case 1:
s
_
.853 .902 .919 .920 .903
s
=
.124 .090 .077 .076 .096
=
.977 .992 .996 .996 .999
Case 2: a
2
= 0.6
s
_
.792 .860 .887 .890 .867
s
=
.161 .128 .105 .105 .129
^
.953 .988 .992 .995 .996
Case 3:
2
i no = 1.2
s
=
.717 .799 .844 .848 .821
s
=
.193 .171 .146 .144 .176
31
.910 .970 .990 .992 .997
Case 4
:
a
2
= 1.6
•f
_
.686 .769 .819 .825 .799
s
=
.199 .189 .167 .166 .198
=
.885 .958 .986 .991 .997
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distribution of rent between industry and government. Generally speaking,
the effect of joint bidding is to increase government's share at the
expense of industry. It is apparent, however, that government revenues
do not increase monotonically with the degree of joint bidding. For
example, as joint venture membership grows from 5 to 10 (i.e., the number
of independent bidding entities drops from 4 to 2) , the anti-competitive
effect of joint bidding begins to dominate and government share declines.
However, it is important to note that even in the extreme case (m = 10)
we see that expected government revenues exceed the level that would be
obtained in the absence of joint bidding (m = 1), ceteris paribus.
Thus, we find that both the "size of the pie", f , and the share
captured by the seller, f , increase when firms are allowed to enter joint
bidding ventures. If one were interested solely in maximizing the share
of the rent captured by government, it appears that some limit on the
degree of joint bidding is called for. For all the cases represented
in Table 1, the seller's revenue decreased as the number of venture
partners increased from 5 to 10. It is clear that the well-known anti-
competitive effect of a reduced number of competitors is quite strong
in this range. However, the main point is clear; even when joint ven-
tures are carried to the extreme and the industry is reduced to only
two joint ventures, the rent to society as well as to the government is
higher than in a situation where joint bidding is prohibited.
Figure 1 presents a graphical account of joint bidding's effect on
2
the distribution of rent for the special case where a = 1.2. This is
the case described by Reece [1978] as being most representative of frontier
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FIGURE 1
Effect of Joint Bidding on Division of Rent
E
E
'r-
X
o
c
o
u
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5-
1.0
0.9
0.8
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
- fc
2 3 4 5 6 7
joint venture membership (m)
10
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or wildcat offshore areas. It is instructive to note that Reece (1978)
found that, ceteris paribus, decreasing the number of bidding entities
caused the share of rent captured by industry to rise sharply while both
the government's share and the total fraction captured by society dropped.
By this point, the reason we find the opposite result should be obvious.
In Reece' s work, decreasing the number of competitors had only the anti-
competitive effect on bids submitted. In the present context, this
anticompetitive effect is more than offset by the fact that the bidders,
although fewer in number, are better informed and act more aggressively.
Table 2 presents results that indicate the impact of joint bidding
on the allocative efficiency of the auction. As in table 1, as the degree
of joint bidding increases (reading left to right), favorable effects on
the efficiency of the auction are experienced. These results are also
plotted in Figures 2 and 3 in order to provide additional insight regarding
the mechanism by which joint bidding enhances tract value and government
revenues. In Figure 2 we have plotted the conditional probability that
Q
the tract will be leased, given that it is economic. Better informed
bidders are less likely to overlook such tracts; therefore, the probability
of receiving at least one bid increases with the degree of joint bidding.
As shown in the diagram, the quantitative impact of this effect can be
substantial. In Figure 3 we have plotted the conditional probability
that the tract is economic, given that it has received at least one bid.
Again, the quantitative impact of joint bidding appears to be substantial.
Joint bidders are better informed bidders, and this translates into fewer
mistakes in identifying worthy offshore prospects.
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TABLE 2
Effects of Joint Bidding on Tract Exploitation
P(EJL) = Probability that a Tract is Economic Given that it is Leased
P(L E) = Probability that a Tract is Leased Given that it is Economic
Case 1: a = 0.3
Case 2;
Case 3:
= 0.6
= 1.2
Case 4 : a = 1.6
N
m
= 20
1
10
2
5
4
4
5
2
10
P(E
P(L
L)
E) =
.870
.879
.928
.932
.959
.961
.966
.967
.980
.982
P(E
P(L
L)
E) =
.813
.836
.897
.904
.945
.942
.953
.954
.972
.980
p(e|d
p(l|e)
=
.737
.779
.853
.867
.918
.922
.931
.934
.960
.961
P(E
P(L
[10 = .699
.751
.830
.849
.904
.911
.920
.925
.954
.955
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FiqjRE ?
Conditional Probability that an Economic Tract will be Leased
1.0
0.9
0.3
0.7
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* case 1
case 4
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joint venture membershio (m)
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FIRURE 3
Conditional Probability that a Leased Tract will be Economic
1.0
0.9
0.8
0.7
0.6
0.5
m
1
•
m
1
•
case 1
"* case 4
23456789
joint venture membership (m)
10
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Before turning tc the conclusion, it is important to note some casual
empirical verification of the positive effects of joint bidding described
in this paper. Of all offshore petroleum tracts auctioned prior to 1970,
37% eventually reached production. However, when the tracts are broken
down into those won by joint bidding ventures and those won by solo bidders,
9
the relevant percentages are 44% and 35%, respectively. These figures
support the hypothesis that joint bidding results in more efficient identifi-
cation and exploitation of the available (but a priori unknown) resource.
Additionally, Zimmerman and Merewitz (1974) provide further evidence
as to the efficiency of joint bidding. In their study of cost overruns
in the construction of the Bay Area Rapid Transit system, they found
that cost overruns (as a percentage of contract bids) were significantly
smaller when joint bidding ventures were involved. In fact, they found
that the percentage of cost overrun declined with increasing membership
in the joint venture. This is as the present model predicts; the addi-
tion of members to the joint venture implies better information and more
efficient outcomes.
4 . Conclusions
Previous research on the effects of joint bidding has left consid-
erable doubt and uncertainty regarding the net impact of this controver-
sial practice. Positive and negative aspects are widely cataloged in
the literature, but there has been little analysis of the inherent trade-
offs between the two. As a result, policymakers maintain an ambivalent
stance vis a vis joint bidding.
The present paper attempts to extend our understanding of joint
bidding by the use of a model that explicitly incorporates both positive
-20-
and negative aspects. Analysis of the model reveals that joint bidding
facilitates the exchange of proprietary information and reduces the level
of uncertainty that impinges on the market for offshore tracts. The end
result is more efficient exploitation of the potential resources and a
more equitable distribution of available economic rents. Although cer-
tain anti-competitive effects devolve from joint bidding due to the
consolidation of potential rivals, our analysis shows that they do not
dominate in the final market outcome. Significantly, our favorable con-
clusions regarding joint bidding would be strengthened considerably if
we also took into account the probable benefits from increased entry
and diversification of risk that are associated with joint bidding.
The major policy conclusion to emerge from this study is that the
benefits from joint bidding are substantial and not confined only tc the
case of small firms. Whereas previous authors (e.g., Wilcox [1974] and
Mead [1967]) have suggested that large firms may not benefit appreciably
from the enhanced potential for market entry and diversification that
joint bidding affords, it is clear from our analysis that society at
large benefits significantly from joint bidding, whether the participants
be small firms or large. The fraction of total available rent captured
by society increases monotonically with the degree of joint bidding,
provided only that all firms do not collapse into a single monopsonistic
bidder.
-21-
FOOTNOTES
Wilcox, Mead, and Gaskins and Vann all suggest that since major
oil companies are unlikely to benefit significantly from joint bidding's
facility for entry and risk diversification, joint ventures between
majors should be prohibited. As we later demonstrate, this argument
neglects a major benefit of joint bidding.
"This point was first noted by Klein in his short but insightful
discussion of joint bidding ventures. However, Klein's discussion stops
short of considering the impact of information pooling on the outcome
of a game-theoretic bidding model.
3
In their Congressional testimony, Gaskins and Vann point out the
potential significance of information pooling among joint venture part-
ners. However, they consider only the adverse case where partners exchange
information regarding intent to bid, somewhat akin to market allocation
arrangements. The effect of pooling information regarding tract value
estimates is neglected entirely.
4
For example, this estimate can be obtained by performing a geo-
physical survey of the tract in question.
Since firms are identical, the degree of joint bidding appropriate
for one is appropriate for all. Consequently, the restriction to a
uniform degree of joint bidding is made without loss of generality.
However, an implicit constraint on m is that is be chosen to result in
integer values of N.
The value m = 20 (i.e., N = 1) is not included for the obvious
reason; when a monopsony market structure prevails the non-cooperative
bidding framework collapses.
The reader will note that column one confirms previously published
results which indicate that more information, ceteris paribus, leads to
more aggressive bidding on the part of auction participants.
8 2 2
Only case 1 (a = .3) and case 4 (a = 1.6) are depicted in
figure 2. As is clear from the table, the intermediate cases fall
between the two cases represented in the figure.
Q
These statistics are reported on page 86 of Gribbin et. al. [1979].
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